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DESIGNATION OF THE PARTIES
The Plaintiff-Appellee WEST VALLEY CITY is a Utah
municipal corporation. The Defendant-Appellant TERESA
FOY is a natural person.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
DESIGNATION OF THE PARTIES

. . .i

TABLE OF CONTENTS

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

i

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

6

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

11

ARGUMENT

12
1. SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE
PLAINTIFF WAS INAPPROPRIATE
A.

GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT
SHOULD HAVE PRECLUDED
THE GRANTING OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT
IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF MUNICIPALITY
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
•

•

•

•

•

•

12
•

•

•

•

- i - <Ci

B. THE CITY'S FAILURE TO ADEQUATELY COMPLY
WITH PERTINENT PRE-TRIAL DISCOVERY REQUESTS
ESTOPS THE CITY FROM ASSERTING
THE FACTS ARE NOT IN GENUINE DISPUTE
29
2. CITY'S FAILURE TO FOLLOW ITS OWN
ORDINANCES [CONCERNING THE GRANTING
OF THE REQUESTED "HEARING"]
PRECLUDES SUMMARY JUDGMENT
IN FAVOR OF THE CITY
31
3.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED
IN OSTENSIBLY IMPOSING
PERSONAL LIABILITY UPON DEFENDANT FOY
FOR THE CLAIMED VIOLATIONS
ON THE SOUTHERN PARCEL
OWNED BY THE CORPORATE ENTITY
BY REASON OF HER "DIRECTOR" STATUS
WITH THAT CORPORATION
35
4. THE ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION,
AS WELL AS THIS JUDICIAL PROCEEDING
SEEKING ENFORCEMENT OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION, IS INVALID
INASMUCH AS IT CONTRAVENES THE EXPRESS PROVISIONS
OF SECTION 10-11-1 ET SEQ, UTAH CODE
44
5.

TRIAL COURT'S DISMISSAL OF "WRONGFUL LIEN"
COUNTERCLAIM WAS IMPROPER DUE TO
GENUINE DISPUTE AS TO FACT
48

CONCLUSION

49

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY

51

ADDENDA
EXHIBIT
EXHIBIT
EXHIBIT
EXHIBIT
EXHIBIT
EXHIBIT

1: 25 October 1997 REQUEST FOR HEARING
2: 24 Nov 1997 FOY letter
3: DEFENDANT'S Requests for Admissions
4: CITY'S Responses to discovery requests
5. Section 10-11-1, Utah Code
6: WEST VALLEY CITY "CODE ENFORCEMENT"
ORDINANCES
EXHIBIT 7. District Court "Memorandum Decision"
EXHIBIT
8.Howard
District
Court
"Summary
Judgment"
Order
Digitized by the
W. Hunter Law Library,
J. Reuben
Clark Law School,
BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases cited
Allstate Insurance Company vs Liberty Mutual
Insurance Group, 868 P.d 110, 112 (Utah
Court of Appeals 1994)

4, 5

Bennion vs Graham Resources, Incorporated,
849 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah 1993)

5

Commercial Union Associates vs Clayton,
863 P.2d 29 (Utah Court of Appeals 1993) . . . .

5

Harding vs Alpine City,
656 P.2d 985 (Utah Supreme Court 1982) . . . 46, 47
Hebertson vs Bank One, Utah, N.A.,
1999 UT APP 34 (Utah Court of Appeals 1999). 13, 14
Herr vs Salt Lake County,
525 P. 2d 728 (Utah Supreme Court 1974)

34

Higgins vs Salt Lake County,
855 P. 2d 231 (Utah Supreme Court 1993)

5

Howell vs Howell,
806 P.2d 1209 (Utah Court of Appeals 1993) . . .

6

Kasco Services Corporation vs Benson,
831 P.2d 86 (Utah Supreme Court 1992)

4

McMahan vs Dees,
873 P.2d 1172 (Utah Court of Appeals 1994) . . .

4

Ong International (U.S.A.), Incorporated vs 11th
Avenue Corporation, 850 P.2d 447
(Utah Supreme Court 1993)

5

Provo River Water Users' Association vs
Morgan, 857 P.2d 927 (Utah Supreme Court 1993) . 5
Sanders vs Ovard,
838 P.2d 1134 (Utah Supreme Court 1992)

....

5

Society of Separationists, Inc. vs Taggart,
862 P.2d 1339 (Utah Supreme Court 1993) . . . .

4

Springville Citizens for a Better Community vs
City of Springville, 1999 UT 25, 979 P.2d 332
(Utah Supreme Court 1999)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

21

Stratton vs West States Construction,
21 Utah 2d 60, 440 P.2d 111 (Utah Supreme Court
1968)
41
United Park City Mines Company vs Greater Park
City Company, 870 P.2d 880, 885 (Utah Supreme
Court 1993)

4

Wade vs Stangl,
869 P.2d 9 (Utah Court of Appeals 1994)

4

....

West Valley City vs Roberts,
1999 UT APP 358, 993 P.2d 252 (Utah Court of
Appeals 1999)
34, 35
Statutes cited
Section 10-11-1, Utah Code

...

3, 44, 45, 46, 50

Section 16-I0a-302, Utah Code

42

Section 57-1-13, Utah Code

43

Section 63-46b-19, Utah Code

....

2, 10, 28, 29

Section 78-2a-3 (2) (j ) , Utah Code

1

Other authorities
18B Am Jur 2d, "Corporations", §1829

. . . . 40, 41

West Valley City Municipal Code:
Section 1-1-102

33

Section 1-1-109 . .

33, 34

Section 10-1-110

14, 27

Section 10-1-202

42

Section 10-2-102

. . .

17

Section 10-2-103

20

Section 10-2-501

. 19, 20

Section 10-2-503

32, 33

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT
Jurisdiction of this Court is granted pursuant to
the provision of Section 78-2a-3(2)(j), Utah Code, and
pursuant to the "pour over" Order of the Utah Supreme
Court entered in this case.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
This appeal and the predicate factual and legal
situation

in which

is arose present

the

following

issues:
1.

Whether

the

District

Court

erred

in

granting summary judgment when (1) there were
genuine issues of material fact before the
Court which should have precluded such summary
judgment and

(2) the Plaintiff WEST VALLEY

CITY ["the CITY"] did not show it was, as a
matter of law, entitled to judgment.
2.

Whether

the

CITY,

admitting

that

it

received the "request for hearing" document in
a timely manner, can ignore and disregard the
mandatory provisions and requirements of its
own ordinances and procedures, by failing to
provide the requested "hearing".
3.

Whether the District Court properly ruled

in favor of the City and against Defendant FOY
when there were genuine issues of fact in
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1

dispute as to whether the observed violations
were actually upon her parcel.
4.

Whether the District Court, by ruling

within the factually-disputed issue concerning
the "request for hearing" and the Defendant's
claimed (by the Court, but not necessarily by
the

CITY)

"failure

to

exhaust

her

administrative remedies" that she had not
requested a hearing, violated the provisions
of Section 63-46-19(3), Utah Code, concerning
the "defenses" allowed to Defendant FOY.
5.

Whether

the

District

Court

erred

in

denying the Defendant an opportunity for trial
on the basis that she had "failed to exhaust
her administrative remedies" when she had, in
fact and in law, fully complied with the
municipal

ordinances

applicable

to

the

"request for hearing", that she had acted
through her agent in timely requesting the
"hearing",

had

clothed

that

agent

with

"apparent authority" to act in her behalf, and
it was the City, in disregard of its own
ordinances,

which

failed

to

hold

the

previously-scheduled "hearing", ostensibly out
of

fear

of

improperly

disregarding

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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her

"rights"

(so the

City

assessed

the

full

amounts of "fines" against her).
6.

Whether or not the District Court erred

in granting summary judgment when the CITY
failed to abide by the clearly applicable
provisions

of

Section

10-11-1, Utah

Code

[pertaining to the duties of local enforcement
officers in cases of debris and clutter],
including but not limited to the fact that the
City incurred "no clean-up expense" because
the CITY did not clean-up the parcel, as the
statute requires.
7.

Whether the municipality is bound by the

limitations and restrictions clearly imposed
by the provisions of state statute [Section
10-11-1 et seq, Utah Code] and must abide by
such provisions, or whether generalized vague
and

ambiguous

authorizing

"enabling

enforcement

legislation"

actions

against

"nuisances" (not necessarily so characterized
in the municipal ordinances) may trump the
more detailed and dispositive provisions of
state statute.
8.

Whether or not the District Court erred

in holding the Defendant personally liable for
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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the debts of a validly-formed and -operating
corporation when the Defendant natural person
was merely a "director" of said corporation
which owned the parcel upon which the majority
of the alleged violations occurred.
9.

Whether

the

1998

"Notice"

document

recorded by the County was a "wrongful lien"
as proscribed by Section 38-11-901 et seq,
Utah

Code,

and

whether

issues

of

fact

precluded the District Court from granting
summary judgment in the municipality's favor
on that issue.
For each of the foregoing "legal" issues identified
above, the "standard of review" for the appellate court
in this case is as follows:
A trial court's conclusions of law in civil cases
are reviewed for correctness. United Park City Mines
Company vs Greater Park City Company, 870 P.2d 880, 885
(Utah Supreme Court 1993); Society of Separationists,
Inc. vs Taggart, 862 P.2d 1339, 1341 (Utah Supreme
Court 1993); Kasco Services Corporation vs Benson, 831
P.2d 86, 89 (Utah Supreme Court 1992); McMahan vs Dees,
873 P.2d 1172, 1175 (Utah Court of Appeals 1994); Wade
vs Stangl,

869 P. 2d 9, 12 (Utah Court of Appeals

1994) ; Allstate Insurance Company vs Liberty Mutual
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Insurance Group,

868

P.2d

111, 112

(Utah Court of

Appeals 1994) .
Whether the trial court properly interpreted (or
applied) a statute is a question of law reviewed for
correctness. Ong International (U.S.A.), Incorporated
vs 11th Avenue Corporation,
Supreme

Court

Incorporated,

19 93);

850 P.2d 447, 450 (Utah

Bennion

vs

Graham

Resources,

849 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah 1993); Jacobsen

Investment Company vs State Tax Commission, 83 9 P.2d
789, 790 (Utah Supreme Court 1992).
This standard of review has also been referred to
as

a

"correction

of

error

standard".

Jacobsen

Investment Company vs State Tax Commission, 83 9 P. 2d
789, 790 (Utah Supreme Court 1992);
838

P.2d

1134,

1135

(Utah

Sanders vs Ovard,

Supreme

Court

1992);

Commercial Union Associates vs Clayton, 863 P. 2d 29, 36
(Utah Court of Appeals 1993) . "Correction of error"
means that no particular deference is given to the
trial court's ruling on questions of law.

Provo River

Water Users' Association vs Morgan, 857 P.2d 927, 931
(Utah Supreme Court 1993); Higgins vs Salt Lake County,
855

P.2d

231, 235

(Utah

Supreme

Court

1993).

The

"correction of error" standard means that the appellate
court decides the matter for itself and does not defer
in any degree to the trial judge's determination of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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law. Howell vs Howell, 806 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah Court
of Appeals 1993) .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In September 1997 the Plaintiff WEST VALLEY CITY
[hereinafter

"the

CITY"]

adopted

ordinances

to

establish and implement a "code enforcement program".
Approximately 35 days later

in October 1997

CITY

code enforcement officers allegedly observed numerous
items of debris, junk, deleterious objects, and other
"clutter" upon what those officers believed
INCORRECTLY

albeit

to be a single parcel, owned by the

Defendant-Appellant TERESA FOY. [In actuality, of the
SIX claimed violations, fully FOUR thereof were upon
the Lancer, Incorporated parcel. A fifth violation was
upon both parcels. And the sixth violation was upon
only

the

FOY parcel.]

At

times material

hereto,

Defendant FOY was the sole owner of a 0.15-acre parcel
of real estate, located at 3247 West 3650 South, West
Valley City and upon which was located a single-family
residential

dwelling.

The

dimensions

of

the

"FOY

parcel" are approximately 64 feet in the east-west
direction and 104 feet in the north-south dimension.
Plaintiff's Complaint, %3. RECORD at 000002. [Unknown
to

CITY

personnel

violations

at

the

time

of

the

observed

but made known to them shortly thereafter-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6

--was

the

legal

existence

and

status

of

a

second

parcel, the "LANCER, INCORPORATED parcel immediately
south of the "FOY parcel".]
As required by City ordinance the code enforcement
officers prepared and caused to be mailed to Defendant
FOY, then residing in Blanding, Utah, a "notice of
violation" directing her to clean up the clutter on her
(sic) parcel
request

"a

and

notifying

hearing"

on

her

the

of

her

matter.

"right"

to

Plaintiff's

Complaint, 115 Plaintiff's Complaint. RECORD at 000002.
In response to the "notice" mailed to her, Defendant
FOY

contacted

her

husband

Jim

Decker

who,

with

others, were occupying the Foy parcel (and the Lancer,
Incorporated parcel) as tenants thereon. Mr Decker and
others were in fact responsible for the clutter and
zoning violations ostensibly identified by the CITY. Mr
Decker caused a letter to be prepared which requested
"a hearing", as follows:
October 25, 1997
to: Administrative Hearing Coordinator
City of West Valley
Ordinance Enforcement Office
3600 South Consitutuion Blv.
West Valley, Utah 84119
re:

case # 97-5215

from: Renter K Cooper
3247 West 3650 South
West Valley, Utah 84119
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Dear Sirs,
Please schedual a hearing as to the above.
Request: 1. That the ordinance officer who
issued the citation be present at the hearing.
2.
That the officer be available for
minor questions, discussion.
The landlady, of this particular property,
resides in distance South Eastern, Utah. She
has made it very clear that she will have no
envolement
whatsoever.
Furtherwell,
she
expects this matter to be handle between us
here in West Valley City, directives should be
sent to the renter at the above address.
The Landlady's only wish: to be informed "once
and only once" of the clearance/resolution of
these charges.
Could a complete copy of the citation as well
as excerpts of the city code cited as
violations be mailed? We will be expecting a
letter directly from the City Ordinance, soon.
Thank you.
Emphasis added. Spelling errors in original. RECORD at
000055. A photocopy of the "request for hearing", dated
showing receipt by the CITY, is found at ATTACHMENT 1
to this APPELLANT'S BRIEF.] The letter was properly
addressed to the specified person, was timely mailed
with proper postage affixed to the envelope, and was
ACTUALLY

RECEIVED

by

the

City,

BEFORE

the

stated

deadline.
Although Ms FOY's husband (Mr Decker) stated the
CITY originally scheduled a "hearing" as requested, the
CITY claims no hearing was scheduled.

[The CITY does

not dispute that a case file was "opened" against Mr
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Decker

albeit against

the

"corporate parcel"

on

December 1st (1997); the hearing on Mr Decker's case
was held on December 8th

a mere five days later! See

AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES DECKER. RECORD at 000091-000095. The
CITY

has

offered

no

credible

explanation

for

the

apparent discrepancy that the "Jim Decker case" was
opened and proceeded to "hearing" in as short a period
as seven days, when the municipal ordinance grants to
the propertyowner a ten-day period in which to request
"a hearing". Furthermore, the CITY has been unable to
produce a written "request for hearing" on the "Jim
Decker case", nor do the City's records contain such a
"written request".]
Although the CITY acknowledged that the original
"Request for Hearing" letter referred to the property
address correctly, the stated "case number", and that
the owner lived in southern Utah and had requested the
on-site persons to handle the matter with the City, the
City

"did nothing" with the

"request for hearing".

Eventually, a hearing officer

ostensibly as a result

of

ex

parte

personnel

communications

from

Code

Enforcement

assessed almost $7,000 in "administrative

fines" against the Defendant TERESA FOY for the alleged
six violations allegedly observed upon her parcel.
Shortly thereafter the CITY filed with the Salt
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Lake County Recorder a "Notice of V i o l a t i o n " d e s c r i b i n g
the a l l e g e d v i o l a t i o n s
which

had

resulted

and the f a c t s
in

the

and p r o c e s s e s

assessment

of

the

a d m i n i s t r a t i v e " f i n e s " a g a i n s t the FOY p a r c e l .
When the City was unable t o c o l l e c t the " f i n e s " i t s
"hearing o f f i c e r " had a s s e s s e d , the CITY i n s t i t u t e d the
judicial
Valley

action

in

Department,

the Third D i s t r i c t

Court,

to

judgment

obtain

a civil

West
to

c o l l e c t those " f i n e s " . 1
The Defendant

responded t o the c i v i l

a c t i o n by

pleading numerous f a c t u a l and l e g a l defenses t o the
CITY'S pleaded c l a i m s . U l t i m a t e l y , the Defendant f i l e d
a counterclaim a g a i n s t the CITY for the CITY'S f i l i n g
of a "wrongful l i e n " a g a i n s t her p a r c e l . [In the course
of the l i t i g a t i o n ,

the D i s t r i c t Court

holding t h a t

the recorded documents were not a " l i e n "

granted

p a r t i a l summary judgment in favor of the City on the
x

The instant judicial action, filed in the D i s t r i c t Court for
the so-pleaded singular purpose of obtaining a "judgment" to
collect the "administrative fines" imposed by the Administrative
Hearing Officer, contravenes the prohibition found in Section 6346b-19(2)(c), Utah Code, which provides:
(c) Except to the extent expressly authorized by
statute, a complaint seeking c i v i l enforcement of an
agency's order may not request, and the court may not
grant, any monetary payment apart from taxable costs.
Emphasis added. Coupled with the proscriptions and limitations
imposed upon the CITY by the provisions of Section 10-11-1 et seq,
Utah Code, pertaining to the procedures to be followed by the CITY,
the foregoing limitation arguably precludes the action altogether.
The "judgment" prepared by the CITY'S counsel and entered by
the District Court does not award any monetary payment to the CITY,
even though such
was sought in the i n i t i a l pleadings.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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counterclaim.] RECORD at 000406-000409.
In May 2003 the District Court entered an Order
granting the CITY'S Motion for Summary Judgment. RECORD
at 000714-000716. This appeal ensued.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Defendants' arguments are summarized as follows:
1.

Summary

Judgment

in

favor

of

the

Plaintiff was inappropriately granted due to
the

genuine

dispute

of

material

fact:

particularly, Defendant FOY did, in fact,
request

a

hearing

albeit

through

her

authorized agents.
2.

The City should be estopped to assert the

facts are not in genuine dispute due to its
own

intentional

respond

to

failure

the

to

meaningfully

Defendant's

"pre-trial

discovery" efforts.
3.

The

City's

failure

to

abide

by

the

"mandatory" provisions of its own ordinances
(to grant a hearing) precludes successful
judicial action in this case.
4.

The District Court erred in granting

Summary Judgment against Defendant FOY for all
of the claimed violation when CITY witnesses
had previously testified under oath that only
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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a portion of the "violations" were located
upon the FOY parcel.
5.

The

District

Court

erred

in

holding

Defendant FOY personally responsible for the
corporate

"violations" because

she was a

director of that corporation.
6.

The

provisions

of

the

CITY'S

"code

enforcement ordinances" violate the detailed
and specific provisions of Section 10-11-1 et
seq, Utah Code, pertaining to the duties of
cities in cases of "weedy lots", etc.
7.

The District Court erred in prematurely

dismissing the Defendant's counterclaim on the
"wrongful lien" issues.
ARGUMENT
I
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF
WAS INAPPROPRIATE
A
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT SHOULD HAVE PRECLUDED
THE GRANTING OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT
IN FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF MUNICIPALITY
The CITY, on numerous occasions, sought "summary
judgment" in its favor on the basis that the Defendant
FOY had failed to request a "hearing" before the
Administrative Hearing Officer. Such statements
Defendant

FOY

did

"not

request

a

hearing"

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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that
are

incorrect, misleading and constitute a "play on words",
advanced in self-serving fashion by Plaintiff CITY and
its counsel to justify the municipality's FAILURE TO
COMPLY WITH ITS OWN ORDINANCES.
The CITY, claiming to have ignored the timely-filed
"K Cooper request for hearing"2, seeks to justify its
actions

(ala inaction) by focusing upon the "agency"

(or claimed lack thereof) of "Renter K Cooper". That
disingenuous analysis and position is materially flawed
and the District Court should have neither countenanced
nor implicitly accepted that argument.
The correct analysis should focus upon the FACT
THAT A

HEARING

WAS

REQUESTED,

ON THE

PROPERTY

IN

QUESTION, CONCERNING THE VERY VIOLATIONS AT ISSUE, BY
A PERSON WHO WAS ARGUABLY A "RESPONSIBLE PERSON" AND
WHO CLAIMED TO HAVE AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY TO ACT
FOR DEFENDANT TERESA FOY!
In Hebertson vs Bank One, Utah, N^A. 1999 UT App
342, %2, 995 P. 2d 7 (quoting Parker vs Dodgion, 971
P.2d 496, 496-497 (Utah Supreme Court 1998), the Court
of Appeals wrote:

2

See AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES DECKER, RECORD at 000091-00095,
which claims that the CITY initially scheduled a "hearing" on
the "Teresa Foy parcel", but "switched" the hearing to the
newly-opened "case" [involving the "Jim Decker (ala Lancer,
Inc.) parcel] only SEVEN DAYS AFTER that case was originally
opened!
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"In reviewing a grant of summary judgment,
[the appellate court] considers the facts in
light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
1999 UT App 342 at 1J2 . Emphasis added.
The so-called "agency issue" (of K Cooper, to act
for FOY) might be meritorious and legally significant
IF the CITY were

attempting

to hold Defendant

FOY

liable for the acts of the "agent" selected by her.
Such is NOT the case here! On the contrary: the CITY is
trying to OVERLOOK ITS OWN FAILURES in NOT granting a
"hearing" on a hypertechnical argument, advanced in
"bad faith" and contrary to its own procedures and
policies, as embodied within its own ordinances.
The

"administrative

code

enforcement"

[A.C.E.]

program is governed by the provisions of Title 10 of
the CITY'S "Municipal Code". Section 10-1-110 of the
CITY'S "Municipal Code", pertaining to "definitions"
applicable to the "code enforcement program", provides
as follows:
(19)
"Property Owner" means the record
owner of real property based on the County
Assessor's records.
(21)
"Responsible Person" means a person
the City determines is responsible for causing
or maintaining a violation of the City Codes
or
applicable
state
codes.
The
term
"Responsible Person" includes, but is not
limited to, a property owner, tenant, person
with a legal interest in real property, or
person in possession of real property.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Emphasis

added.

[Arguably,

the

first

sentence

contemplates some kind of adjudicative process by which
the "City determines [the person to be] responsible for
. . . a violation". Thus, Renter K Cooper could

if

the City chose to approach it in this fashion

be

deemed to be "a responsible person". Thus, his "request
for hearing" is facially valid and should have been
honored. That the City purports to find persons OTHER
THAN PROPERTYOWNERS to be "responsible persons" is
confirmed by the "administrative order" entered in "the
Jim Decker case"

[A.C.E. case # 97-6058, in which

Teresa Foy was found

INCORRECTLY, nevertheless

to

be the "owner" of the parcel (i.e. "the Lancer parcel")
but James Decker was found to be "the responsible
person", against whom the administrative order was
entered and upon which the City ultimately took a civil
judgment

ultimately satisfied

in the Third District

Court.3]
Thus, within the "four corners" of the "request for

3

The judgment taken by the CITY and later satisfied
should constitute a "res judicata" and/or "collateral
estoppel" defense, as such involved the very same parcel (the
Lancer parcel) , the very same claimed violations, and the very
same time.
For this new defense which was not available to Defendant
TERESA FOY at the time she filed her original "answer", she
has concurrently filed a motion for leave to amend to file an
amended answer, to incorporate the "collateral estoppel"
defense now available to her.
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hearing" document

[i.e. the "K Cooper letter"], the

writer thereof has affirmatively stated his source of
authority (i.e. his "agency", as we are now describing
it): namely, the landlady wants us (here in Salt Lake
County) to handle the problem and deal with West Valley
City.

In

the

information

"request

for

hearing"

he

recites

(dates, property address, WVC case file

number, the request itself, and so forth) WHICH COULD
BE KNOWN ONLY BY A PERSON WITH WHOM DEFENDANT TERESA
FOY

HAD

SHARED

SUCH

CONFIDENTIAL

INFORMATION.

The

"notice of violation" was MAILED to Defendant FOY in
"southeastern

Utah",

exactly

consistent

with

what

Renter K Cooper was saying. A mere 11 days later after
the assumed mailing of the "Notice of Violation" to
FOY, the October 25th "request for hearing" is mailed
and is thereafter received by the CITY. It is "filed"
in the very case file

[#97-5215] applicable to the

"Teresa Foy case".4 The foregoing, read "in good faith"
(which the CITY now doesn't want

to practice)

and

reasonably would lead to one clear conclusion: that the
"agent"

(e.g. "Renter K Cooper") has been ostensibly

clothed with what the law characterizes is "apparent

4

The Defendant's attempts [December 1999 and March 2002]
to ascertain the FACTUAL TRUTH of the CITY'S scheduling of
"hearing" in the "Teresa Foy case" have been consistently and
effectively resisted and frustrated by the CITY and its
counsel!
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authority"! In recognition of the "apparent authority"
of such person (indeed, a "responsible person"), the
CITY

simply

should

initially did
CITY DIDN'T

the

scheduled

which

and thereafter conducted

CITY

which the

the requested hearing.

The CITY'S
to

have

Municipal Code [Title 10] pertaining

issuance

and

contents

of

the

"notice

of

violation" expressly provides as follows:
10-2-102.

NOTICE OF VIOLATION.

. . . The notice of violation shall include
the following information:
(1) Procedures to request a hearing,
and consequences for failure to
request one.
There is NO STATED REQUIREMENT

within EITHER the

Ordinance or the form "notice" promulgated and issued
in ostensible compliance with the Ordinance
requires

any

"agency"

designation

be

which
proved

concurrently with the submission of the "request for
hearing". There is but a SINGLE SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENT
concerning the "request for hearing": that it be "in
writing". Contrary to the CITY'S counsel's frequent
assertion, there is within the ordinance NO stated
requirement that (1) the "request" be manually signed,
or (2) that the "request" be in any specified form, or
(3) that any "agency" situation requires a formal
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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designation and/or additional language or notarization.
In similar vein, the "notice of violation" letter from
the CITY contained NO EXPRESS REQUIREMENTS as to a
specified or expected

"form" or "substance" to be

contained in the "request for hearing". As per the
1993-recorded

quit-claim

deed,

the

CITY

and

its

officials were presumptively and officially "on notice"
that Lancer, Incorporated owned the "south parcel",
which contained the majority of the observed alleged
"violations"! Thus, the CITY cannot ignore the "K
Cooper letter", whether written as FOY's agent or not;
Cooper, as a tenant, in-possession, etc., must be
deemed to be a "Responsible Person" and his "request
for hearing" is mandated to be acted upon. In any
event, K Cooper can be deemed to be an agent of the
Lancer, Incorporated entity!
The October 1997 "Notice of Violation" states, in
pertinent part, as follows:
Hearing Rights
You have the right to request a hearing to
determine if any violations exist on your
property or if you have allowed violations to
occur for which you are responsible. You must
file a written request for hearing within 10
days from the date the notice of violation was
issued. If the notice was mailed, the request
for hearing must be made within 13 days of the
mailing date. Address the request to the
attention
of
"Administrative
Hearing
Coordinator." Please include your name,
address, telephone number, case or citation
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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number, and violation address. . . .
Emphasis added.
The "Renter K Cooper letter" is addressed to the
Administrative

Hearing

Coordinator.

The

letter

conforms, IN SUBSTANCE, to the mandatory provisions, as
directed.

The

permissive

(i.e.

"please

include")

requirements WERE HONORED WITH EXACTNESS, except for
the providing of a telephone number.

[There is no

requirement under the law for a person to have a
telephone

number.

Furthermore,

that

the

CITY has

DEMANDED that everything be "in writing" visciates any
"requirement" concerning the need for a telephone
number, which might be useful only in the context of
scheduling a hearing!] The CITY knows exactly that the
"Renter K Cooper" letter refers to this case, because
the letter has been filed in the "Teresa Foy case"
official file!
The CITY itself characterizes the situation (i.e
the propertyowner's entitlement to a hearing) as being
a "right". [See "Notice of Violation" letter. CITY
ordinances also utilize the characterization "right".]
Indeed, Section 10-2-501 of the CITY'S Municipal Code
provides:
10-2-501.

DECLARATION OF PURPOSE.

The City Council finds that there is a need to
establish
uniform
procedures
for
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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administrative code enforcement hearings
conducted pursuant to the City Code. It is the
purpose and intent of the City Council to
afford due process of law to any person who is
directly affected by an administrative action.
Due process of law includes adequate notice,
an opportunity
to participate
in the
administrative hearing, and an adequate
explanation of the reasons justifying the
administrative action. These procedures are
also intended to establish a forum to
efficiently, expeditiously, and fairly resolve
issues
raised
in
any
administrative
enforcement action.
Emphasis added.
Section 10-2-103 of the West Valley City ordinances
provides:
10-2-103.

REQUESTING HEARING.

The responsible person has the right to
request an administrative hearing. The request
must be in writing and must be filed within
ten days from the date of service of the
notice of violation. Failure to request a
hearing as provided shall constitute a waiver
of the right to a hearing.
Emphasis added.
It is the most ironic paradox that the corporate
entity [LANCER, INCORPORATED] cannot "act through its
agent" ["Renter K Cooper" as a "responsible party", if
the City chooses]. The City should not be allowed to
"pick

and

choose"

which

"agent"

it

is

bound

to

acknowledge. Indeed, following receipt of the "request
for hearing", the City through its agents engaged in
considerable dialogue with Defendant FOY concerning who
actually was her "agent" for purposes of the property
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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and

the

scheduled

hearing,

and

inspections

of

the

property. See EXHIBIT 2, attached to this APPELLANT'S
BRIEF. RECORD at 000052.
The CITY should not be allowed

to say that a

hearing was not requested (by FOY). BECAUSE A HEARING
WAS REQUESTED! Concerning this type of issue

(i.e.

municipality's compliance with its own ordinances) , the
Utah Supreme Court has written:
. . . Stated simply, the City cannot "change
the rules halfway through the game." Brendle
vs City of Draper, 937 P.2d 1044, 1048 (Utah
Ct. App. 1997)• The City was not entitled to
disregard its mandatory ordinances. Because
the City did not properly comply with the
ordinances governing P.U.D. approval, we
conclude that under Utah Code Ann. §10-91001(3) (b), the City's decision approving the
P.U.D. was illegal.
Springville Citizens vs City of Springville, 979 P.2d
332 at 338, 199 UT 25, 1J3 0 (Utah Supreme Court 1999).
Emphasis added. In this context, the "mandatory" term
"shall" describing the duty of the CITY'S director to
"schedule"

(and,

implicitly,

to

hold)

a

hearing

concerning the violations cannot be overlooked. The
CITY'S failure to conduct the hearing is a fatal defect
which absolutely precludes the entry of judgment in the
CITY'S favor.
The ironic paradox of the CITY'S position (i.e. no
hearing was granted, because no hearing was requested)
is

illuminated

by

the

remarks made

by

the

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

21

CITY'S

attorney

during

the

13 January

2003

oral

argument

before the District Court:
Mr LAWRENCE: . . . Ms. Foy did not request a
hearing within the meaning of the City Statute
which requires that the request for hearing be
in writing and be signed by the responsible
person.5
Ms. Foy now argues that a letter which
the City received which we acknowledge
receiving and we acknowledge receiving it
within the time period but it was from a
person named Kay Cooper, supposed a tenant on
the property. We don't know who Kay Cooper is.
Ms. Foy has made no effort to produce Mr.
Cooper. We don't know what his responsibility
or relationship to her was. The City is not
obligated to take action on the basis of some
stranger. In fact, we feel it is a way of
protecting Ms. Foy's rights in the property
that some stranger who we don't know could
come up and make any type of decision
regarding her property. In the City's opinion
the statute is very clear. A request is in
writing signed by the responsible person. If
she wanted a hearing she should have requested
it. If she wanted to bring in this Cooper
person or her agent, Mr. Decker, she should
have done so through the administrative
process. She chose not to. She chose not to.
She assumed the risk that the fines would be
imposed.
Transcript

of Summary Judgment Hearing,

13 January

2003, page 2, line 8 through page 3, line 3. Emphasis
added. RECORD at 000732-000733.
The CITY'S position is ludicrous and inconsistent.
Under the now-stated justification of "protecting Ms.

5

0n this latter point---that the "request" be signed
the CITY'S attorney is in error and is misleading: there is NO
REQUIREMENT
in either the ordinance or in the "Notice of
Violation" materials sent to the propertyowner
which
requires the
"request" to be signed!
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Foy's

rights"

(Mr

Lawrence's

terminology,

quoted

above), the CITY goes forward and DENIES her the very
"hearing" her agent requested! The CITY then imposes,
through

its

default)

Hearing

Officer,

in

an

fashion, the administrative

ex

parte

fines

(or

in FULL

AMOUNT against her! Some "protection"! [The CITY, were
it as legitimately
FOY's

rights

as

concerned about
it

straightened out the

claims,

"protecting" Ms

could

have

merely

"agency" issue, with Ms FOY.]

Later within the 13 January 2 0 03 "summary judgment
oral argument hearing" Mr Lawrence

(counsel for the

CITY) stated:
MR. LAWRENCE: She acknowledged receiving that
notice. I believe it was October 28th or 29th
which was within the ten day period for her to
respond. Within that ten day period the City
received a letter signed by someone named K.
Cooper, the initial "K". The City did not
accept that as a valid request for a hearing
because we don't know who Mr. Cooper is. We
had no idea of what his connection to the
property was. He claimed he was a tenant. We
don't, the letter claims he was a tenant.
Because we felt that the property owner, the
responsible person has the responsibility of
requesting a hearing, we held that was not a
valid request for a hearing.
Transcript of 13 January 2003 Summary Judgment Hearing,
page 23, lines 8 through 19. Emphasis added. RECORD at
000753 .
The CITY mischaracterized the actual "evidence"
before

the District

Court. The Plaintiff's
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Summary

Judgment

Memorandum

intentionally

misstated

and

misrepresents the administrative history of this case.
The Plaintiff's Memorandum stated [numbered items
#5

of

the

so-called

"Undisputed

Facts"

on page

2

thereof] that
" . . .Foy had the right to a hearing, and had
until October 30, 1997 to request a hearing."
Emphasis

added.

RECORD

at

00560.

The

following

"undisputed fact" [#6] states in its entirety:
6.
Although Foy acknowledged receiving the
Notice, the City received no written request
for a hearing from her.
RECORD at 00560-00561. Emphasis added. As "authority"
for the foregoing assertion, reference is made to the
Deposition of Teresa Foy. Nevertheless, the sophistry
and syntax of the wording of "fact #6" is noteworthy.
When

the

Defendant's

deposition

is

examined,

following testimony is "in the record":
Q (by Mr Lawrence) :
Did you
receive a
Notice of Violation that there were alleged
violations on the property?
A (by Ms Foy):
Yes, I did.
Q
You received the letter, that was at your
address in Blanding?
A
In Blanding, Utah, yes.
Q
Did you contact the West Valley City at
the office?
A
No, I did not.
Q
Did you contact them in writing?
A
No, I did not contact West Valley. I
contacted my agent, Jim Decker who lived at
the property who was my husband.
Q
So you contacted him?
A
Yes.
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the

A
I said this needs to be taken care of*
Q
And to your knowledge did he take care of it?
A
I don't know, I was down in Blanding. I
have no record or I did not see anything or
did not know. I just told him to take care of
it.
Q
Okay, I have no other questions.
DEPOSITION OF TERESA FOY, page 6. RECORD at 00579.
Emphasis added. Thus, Defendant FOY "authorized" her
"agent(s)" to "take care of" the problem: those agents
had "authority" to "request a hearing", and did so!
That Ms FOY did not personally request a hearing
does not imply that a hearing was not requested
albeit by her agent! What has been conveniently deleted
from the CITY'S self-serving characterization of the
"undisputed facts" [i.e. particularly #6] is that the
Plaintiff's

agent

Jim

Decker

caused

a

written

request for hearing to be sent to West Valley City, by
"Tenant K Cooper".
Although the City originally scheduled the matter
for a "hearing" (in December 1997), that hearing was
unilaterally cancelled and the "Jim Decker case"
involving the corporate property

was heard in its

stead. See also SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES DECKER,

Paragraph 3. RECORD at 000513. The City claimed it had
no indication of authority in favor of "K Cooper" to
request a hearing, and so for a month (e.g. November
1997, until November 24th or so) the City dances around
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and requests that Mrs Foy provide some kind of written
authorization, to the effect that Jim Decker is her
"agent". Ultimately, FOY provided that authorization:
her November 24th letter, as included in Plaintiff's
MEMORANDUM. RECORD at 000584.
That the City received a "request for hearing" is
acknowledged

and

confirmed

by

Candace

Gleed,

Administrative Hearing Director, in her deposition, in
which she stated:
Q [by Mr Homer]: Well, you received a written
request for hearing and you obviously thought
that it referred to this parcel because it
ended up in this file?
A [by Ms Gleed]: Correct.
Q: So what did you do at that point?
A: We did nothing with it. . .
Candace Gleed Deposition, page 17, lines 19 through 24.
Emphasis added. [RECORD at

.]

The CITY seemingly takes the inconsistent position
that

the

"Cooper

requisite

letter" does not

"request".

contradicts

the CITY'S

[As

noted,

constitute
this

the

position

earlier actions during the

entire month of November 1997 when the CITY actively
was proceeding towards a scheduled hearing on the "Foy
parcel".6] The

"Cooper letter" was written at the

6

The Defendant FOY attempted to engage in pre-trial
discovery as to the scheduling of the hearing on the "Foy
parcel", the creation of separate files for the "Foy" and
"Lancer" parcels (but only after 1 December 1997), and the
particular violations which were observed on each of the two
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direction of Ms Foy's agent, Mr Jim Decker.

[See

AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES W DECKER. RECORD at 000091-000095.]
It is sufficient to invoke the right to a "hearing" . In
this context, it is further significant that the CITY
seemingly

takes

the

position

that

Ms

Foy

is

a

"responsible person" (for purposes of designating a
natural person to whom the Notice of Violation was
sent).

Section

10-1-110 (u)

of

the

pertinent

WVC

Ordinance gives certain "status" examples to illustrate
who may be considered to be a "responsible person", as
follows:
The term "Responsible Person" includes, but is
not limited to, a property owner, tenant,
person with a legal interest in real property
or person in possession of real property.
Emphasis added. Mr Cooper was a "tenant" and a "person
in possession"

of the real property. Thus,

as a

"responsible person" under the City's own "definition"
for the "Notice of Violation" purposes, his written
letter should be sufficient to invoke the right to a
"hearing", as the City initially commenced to undertake
but in the end did not follow-through.
The Plaintiff has submitted the November 24th
letter of TERESA FOY as "Exhibit C" to its Memorandum.

parcels. This otherwise material and legitimate pre-trial
discovery was strongly resisted by the CITY, which obtained a
"protective order" keeping such critical information
undisclosed.
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Arguably, the letter "speaks for itself". The text of
the letter is interesting: namely, there seems to have
been

considerable

Blanding,

Utah)

discussion
and

the

between
CITY'S

Ms

FOY

(in

administrative

personnel, including but not limited to the CITY'S
apparent

request

that

Ms

FOY

provide

written

documentation as to Mr Jim Decker's "agent" status in
representing the interests of Ms FOY. However, the text
itself is not what is probative of the issues. That the
letter was simply written and submitted

as contrasted

with

submitted

what

it

said

and

is

herewith

is

significant: if only as unqualified PROOF that the CITY
was then proceeding towards a "hearing" as requested!
If a hearing was not going to be conducted, then there
would have been no necessity for the CITY staff dialog
with Ms FOY and request that she submit something in
writing as to Decker's status (as an "agent"). These
factual inferences should have been approached in a
light favorable to the non-moving party

[FOY] , such

that the District Court should not have granted summary
judgment.7
7

The District Court's granting of summary judgment in favor of
the CITY on the basis that FOY had failed to "exhaust her
administrative remedies" (by failing to request a hearing)
implicitly disregards the numerous "legal defenses" FOY pleaded.
That FOY, in the District Court action, is entitled to raise and
defend on those "legal defenses" is provided by Section 63-4619(3), Utah Code, which provides in relevant part:
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THE CITY'S FAILURE TO ADEQUATELY COMPLY WITH
PERTINENT PRE-TRIAL DISCOVERY REQUESTS
ESTOPS THE CITY FROM ASSERTING
THE FACTS ARE NOT IN GENUINE DISPUTE
In

March

2002

the

Plaintiff

responded

to

Defendant's SECOND REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS BY PLAINTIFF
WEST

VALLEY

CITY.

The

Defendant's

"requests

for

admissions" focused upon numerous "factual core issues"
pertinent

to

the

case. The

Plaintiff's

three-page

"response" to the Defendant's "requests for admissions"
is essentially verbatim and consistent8 in its answer
(response), as follows:
The City neither admits nor denies this
request. The records of the West Valley City
Enforcement
Division,
and
the
records
previously submitted in this matter, are the
best evidence pertaining to this request, and
speak for themselves.
Emphasis added. RECORD at 000611-000614. A photocopy of

(3) In any proceeding for civil enforcement of an
agency's order, in addition to any other defenses allowed
by law, a defendant may defend on the ground that:
(a) the order sought to be enforced was issued
by an agency without jurisdiction to issue the
order;
Emphasis added. The CITY'S failure to abide by its own MANDATORY
ordinances deprives the agency of "jurisdiction" to enter the
"order" (i.e. administrative fines) sought to be judicially
enforced.
8

The only difference in any of the responses is that the
response to Request #1 refers to "the records of the Salt Lake
County Recorder", whereas the other responses refer to "the
records of West Valley City code enforcement division".
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the City's 4-page response

is attached

hereto as

EXHIBIT #4. [The Defendant thereafter filed a motion to
determine the sufficiency of the CITY'S responses to
the Requests for Admissions. RECORD at 000672-00697.
The Defendant's motion was denied by the District
Court.]
The Defendant's

"requests for admissions" are

legitimate pre-trial discovery, to which a meaningful
response is REQUIRED. The CITY must admit or deny those
requests; the City should not be allowed to "duck the
issue" through the consistent use of an unresponsive
answer to the "requests for admissions"!
Having
"answers"

given
to

the

such

evasive

Requests

for

and

unresponsive

Admissions

whose

purpose was to precisely focus upon specific factual
issues

the Plaintiff WEST VALLEY CITY cannot now say

that the facts are not in genuine dispute. The CITY, by
its own EVASIVE responses (non-answers) to the Requests
for Admissions cannot claim the facts are not in
genuine dispute; thus, the City cannot claim that
Summary Judgment is appropriate!
To

the

previously-submitted

"requests

for

admissions" and other pre-trial "discovery requests",
first submitted to the City in December 1999, the CITY
did not answer but instead filed a motion for a
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"protective order" and claimed to answer the discovery
would be unduly burdensome. The City eventually agreed
to conduct an "administrative hearing" (the so-called
"remand hearing"), during which the Defendant could
cross-examine the City-provided witnesses and thus
develop a sworn testimony "record" as to the City's
evidence and/or position on these issues. However, when
the City finally conducted the "administrative hearing"
before Remand Hearing Officer Zane Gill9 the City's
attorney (Mr Elliot Lawrence) produced NO WITNESSES,
produced NO SWORN TESTIMONY, and only produced and
offered

for

sufficient

admission
custodial

into
or

evidence

foundational

(but without
explanation)

certain "hearsay" documents (i.e. "corporation" records
from the State of Utah) having nothing to do with the
merits of the claimed violations!
II
CITY'S FAILURE TO FOLLOW ITS OWN ORDINANCES
[CONCERNING THE GRANTING OF THE REQUESTED "HEARING"]
PRECLUDES SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE CITY
As noted above, Defendant FOY, through her "agents"
(who, as "tenants" in possession of the premises, were
"responsible persons" for the alleged "violations")
requested the administrative "hearing". The CITY never

9

ALJ Keith Stoney
who conducted the first hearing
was
disqualified by order of the District Court, which ordered a
new "hearing" before an impartial administrative law judge.
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granted the hearing.10
That a hearing is to be held is MANDATED by the
City's own ordinances! Section 10-2-503 of the CITY'S
"Municipal

Code",

pertaining

to

"REQUEST

FOR

ADMINISTRATIVE CODE ENFORCEMENT HEARING" states:

(2) The request for hearing shall be made in
writing and filed with the Director.
(3) As soon as practicable after receiving
the written notice of the request for hearing,
the Director shall appoint an administrative
code enforcement hearing officer and schedule
a date, time, and place for the hearing.
Emphasis added.
The MANDATORY NATURE of the requirement is stated
clearly.

[Note

the

"passive

voice"

wording

of

Subsection (2) of the ordinance. But Subsection (3) is
absolutely clear that after a "written request for
hearing" is received, the Director "SHALL" schedule a
hearing!]
Section 10-2-503 of the CITY'S "Municipal Code",
pertaining

to

"REQUEST

FOR

ADMINISTRATIVE

10

CODE

Mr Decker asserted that the CITY "switched" the "Foy
hearing" (which had been originally scheduled for early
December) with the "Jim Decker hearing" on the case which had
been "opened" by the CITY just a few days before. See
AFFIDAVIT OF JIM DECKER, %7. RECORD at 000091-000096.The
administrative files of the CITY, produced pursuant to a
G.R.A.M.A. request but not produced pursuant to pre-trial
discovery, as being the subject of a "protective order"
entered by the District Court, are unclear and ambiguous on
these issues.
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ENFORCEMENT HEARING" States:

(2) The request for hearing shall be made in
writing and filed with the Director.
(3) As soon as practicable after receiving
the written notice of the request for hearing,
the Director shall appoint an administrative
code enforcement hearing office and schedule
a date, time, and place for the hearing.
Emphasis added.
The MANDATORY NATURE of the CITY'S usage of the
verb

"shall"

[in WVCMC

§ 10-2-503(3):

as

in

"the

Director shall schedule the hearing"] is made clear by
two provisions of the West Valley City ordinances,
thus:
1-1-102

RULES OF CONSTRUCTION.

In the construction of this Code, and of all
ordinances of the City, the following rules
shall be observed, unless such construction
would be inconsistent with the manifest intent
of the City Council, or the content clearly
requires or indicates otherwise.
(3) "May" means the requirement,
condition, or action referred to in
the sentence is permissive.
(6) "Shall" means the requirement,
condition, or action referred to in
the sentence is mandatory.
Emphasis added.
In WVCMC §10-1-109, adopted in 1997 as part of the
Code Enforcement Ordinance, the municipal ordinance
provides:
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10-1-109 GENERAL RULES OF INTERPRETATION OF
ORDINANCE
For purposes of this Title:
(2) Shall is mandatory, may is permissive.
Emphasis added.
In Springville Citizens for a Better Community vs
City of Springville, 1999 UT 25, 979 P.2d 332
Supreme Court

1999),

the Supreme Court

(Utah

invalidated

municipal action due to the municipality's failure to
comply with its own legislatively-enacted standard made
mandatory through the use of the term "shall". The
Court wrote:
. The irony of the City's position on
appeal is readily apparent: the City contends
that it need only "substantially comply" with
ordinances it has legislatively deemed to be
mandatory. Stated simply, the City cannot
"change the rules halfway through the game."
Brendle v. City of Draper, 937 P.2d 1044, 1048
(Utah Ct. App. 1997) . The City was not
entitled
to
disregard
its
mandatory
ordinances.
1999 UT 25 at 1J3Q, 979 P.2d at 338. Emphasis added.
In Herr vs Salt Lake County, 525 P.2d 728 (Utah
Supreme Court 1974), the Utah Supreme Court wrote:
The meaning of the word shall
that of command.

is ordinarily

Emphasis added. 525 P.2d at 729.
In West Valley City vs Roberts, 1999 Utah Ct App
358, 993 P.2d 252

(Utah Court of Appeals 1999), the
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'

Utah

Court

requirement

of

Appeals

that

held

that

administrative

the

mandatory

hearings

be

tape

recorded warranted a reversal of the District Court's
dismissal of a "petition for review" on the basis that
no electromagnetic recording was actually made. The
case was remanded for a new hearing.11

Ill
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN OSTENSIBLY IMPOSING
PERSONAL LIABILITY UPON DEFENDANT FOY
FOR THE CLAIMED VIOLATIONS ON THE SOUTHERN PARCEL
OWNED BY THE CORPORATE ENTITY BY REASON OF
HER "DIRECTOR" STATUS WITH THAT CORPORATION
As noted, there were in actuality TWO PARCELS upon
which the alleged violations: the 0.15-acre parcel [the
"north parcel" or the "FOY parcel"] actually owned by
FOY and the 0.30-acre parcel [the "south parcel" or the
"Lancer parcel"] owned by the separate legal entity,
Lancer Incorporated, a Utah corporation.
At

the

first

"remand hearing"

(before

l:L

Hearing

The case at bar is procedurally distinguishable from
Roberts, which involved a "petition for review" of the
administrative hearing. In the case at bar, the City
ostensibly seeking judicial action to enforce (i.e. collect
upon its otherwise uncollectible "administrative fines") the
administrative order
has filed the action. The instant
action is NOT one involving "judicial review" of an agency
action. Thus, the Court has no "jurisdiction" to remand the
case back to the administrative hearing officer.
The
CITY'S
failure
to abide by
the
conditions
prerequisite necessary for its claims (that is, to grant the
requested hearing) , simply precludes the CITY
as a matter of
law
of obtaining any judgment in its favor!
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Officer Stoney, who was later disqualified by District
Court action), CITY witnesses testified that only two
of the six alleged violations were observed upon the
FOY parcel. Furthermore, the alleged violations upon
the FOY parcel were cleaned up as of the November 26th
inspection. Thus, there were, at most, only about 2 6
days' (not forty-seven days') worth of violation, and
then only two violations

(not six) . CITY witnesses

claimed that the other FOUR violations were located
SOLELY upon the Lancer, Incorporated parcel. [CITY
witnesses also stated that one of the violations (of
the two) on the FOY parcel was also located on the
Lancer parcel.]
The electromagnetic tape recording of the "remand
hearing" (in lieu of the CITY'S response to the pretrial discovery) was LOST while in the custody of the
CITY and its personnel (Hearing Officer Stoney and/or
others) . Also LOST were the large blueprint-sized
drawing (map) showing the location of the allegedlyobserved "violations", as well as the photograph of
that same map.
At the second "remand" hearing (following Hearing
Officer

Stoney's

disqualification

by

the District

Court), the CITY'S attorney (Mr Lawrence), contrary to
his representations to the District Court (that the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Defendant would have opportunity to develop a factual
record), had available for presentation of sworn, live
testimony NO WITNESSES. Instead, Mr Lawrence merely
presented a few documents
"corporation"
Commerce

actually photocopies of

records from the Utah Department of

ostensibly evidencing the "director" (not

officer) status of Defendant FOY with the Lancer,
Incorporated entity. These documents, with counsel's
unsworn explanation as to foundation and significance,
were received by the "remand" hearing officer (Zane
Gill) over the objection of Defendant FOY, ostensibly
for the purpose of establishing that the "clutter" on
the premises what that of Defendant FOY. [In actuality,
the District Court's "remand order" was intended to
ascertain the "location"

not the "ownership"

of the

observed violations].
The CITY argued

which arguments were ultimately

accepted by the District Court

that as a "corporate

officer" of Lancer, she was PERSONALLY RESPONSIBLE for
the "violations" committed upon the Lancer parcel,
thus :
MR. LAWRENCE: Your Honor, the City has never
said that she's liable for the actual
corporation. We said she is a responsible
person for the actual corporation. A manager
of a business can only serve as a
representative of that business. She's a
director of Lancer Incorporated and she's one
of two shareholders. She's responsible. If she
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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wants to recover from Lancer Incorporated then
she can, if you renew this objection to using
evidence of the hearings that officially
didn't exist.
Transcript of Summary Judgment Hearing, 13 January
2003, page 14, lines 14 through 21. Emphasis added.
RECORD at 000728-000756.
That the City would argue
Court

would

corporate

ostensibly

"director"

and that the District

rule
(e.g.

that
FOY)

the
is

individual

"personally"

responsible for the debts of the corporation (i.e.
through her payment of the assessed "administrative
fines", for which she can seek "reimbursement" from the
corporation, as Mr Lawrence has stated) goes against
hundreds

and

hundreds

of

years

of

black-letter

"corporate law".
A corporation is a SEPARATE, free-standing entity.
Except in the most narrow of situations
in

the

case

at

bar

a

corporate

not present
director

or

shareholder is NOT PERSONALLY LIABLE for the debts of
the corporate entity.
Because
Defendant

the

FOY

CITY
owned

assumed
the

incorrectly

entire

"parcel"

that
(i.e.

approximately 205 feet in the north-south dimension),
the "administrative order" assessed fines against her
personally for claimed "violations" occurring on the
"southern parcel" (owned by LANCER, INCORPORATED). The
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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City's

oversight

became

apparent

only

after

this

litigation was filed and "answered", although Defendant
FOY's

on-site

agent

(James Decker)

had

previously

explained the situation to CITY personnel.12

12

That the CITY was unaware of the corporate ownership of
the "southern parcel" was "found" by ALJ Keith Stoney during
the first "remand hearing". ALJ Stoney noted:
. . . However, because Lancer Inc., was the owner of
the back parcel, but was unknown to the City;
because the 2nd parcel has the same address as the
first; . . .
Administrative Code Enforcement Order, p. 17, dated 8 August
2000. RECORD at 000489.
Although ALJ Stoney was subsequently disqualified as
being arguably less than impartial within the "remand"
context, his observation on this narrow point is correct.
Furthermore, his finding as to the location of the
various claimed "violations" is absolutely significant. ALJ
Stoney wrote:
(3) The "Notice of Violation" delineated six
violations, four of which existed only on Lancer
Inc. property and a fifth, weeds over six inches,
existed predominantly on Lancer Inc. property.
Emphasis added. RECORD at 000479. Thus, any actual or imputed
bias or lack of objectivity on the part of ALJ Stoney aside,
his
stated
"finding"
(quoted)
as
to
the
locations
AFFIRMATIVELY SHOWS
as was the testimony of the CITY'S OWN
WITNESSES who testified under oath as to the locations of the
claimed "violations"
that FOUR OUT OF SIX claimed violations
occurred on "the Lancer parcel" and NOT the Teresa Foy parcel!
Thus, by simple arithmetic, the most the CITY would be
entitled to receive in a judicial judgment against FOY would
be two-sixths (one-third) of the $6900 claimed: approximately
$2300.
Unfortunately, the CITY has lost, misplaced and/or erased
the electromagnetic tape recording of the Stoney "remand"
hearing. The CITY has also lost the diagram (map) upon which
the City's own witnesses testified as to the locations
with
respect to the two distinct parcels
of the claimed
violations. How convenient! Such certainly deprives the
Defendant of any meaningful "judicial review" of the "remand
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The CITY asserted that because Defendant FOY was
a "director" of LANCER, INCORPORATED, she is still
personally liable for the "fines" assessed for the
claimed

"violations"

committed

upon

the

"Lancer

parcel". Over the vigorous and timely objection of the
Defendant FOY, the District Court implicitly ruled that
she was personally liable for those corporate debts.
It is essentially "black-letter law", established
for centuries that corporate directors and investors
ARE

NOT

PERSONALLY

corporate

entity.

LIABLE
On

this

for

the

debts

particular

of

the

issue

the

encyclopedic work American Jurisprudence (Second) under
the entry "Corporations" and more specifically focusing
upon "director liability" states:
§1829.

Generally

In most instances, the directors or officers
of a corporation are not liable to its
creditors or third persons for corporate acts
or debts. The directors or officers of a
corporation are not liable for corporate acts
and debts simply by reason of their official
relation to the corporation; they are merely
the agents of the corporation and on principle
should no more be held liable therefor than
any other agent should be held liable for the
acts and debts of his principal. They are not ;
guarantors of corporate debts, . . .

hearing" process. [The second "remand hearing" was no better:
the CITY produced NO SWORN WITNESSES. RECORD at 000604. See
also SUPPLEMENTAL AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES W DECKER, %5. RECORD at
000512-000514.]
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18B Am Jur 2d, "Corporations", p. 680. Emphasis added.
Footnotes to cases omitted.
This principle (of non-liability of the corporate
director) is followed in Utah. In Stratton vs West
States Construction, 21 Utah 2d 60, 440 P. 2d 117 (Utah
Supreme Court 1968) , cited in the Am Jur 2d article
quoted herein, the plaintiff had contracted with the
corporate defendant for home remodeling services. The
plaintiff brought suit against the corporation AND its
president

and

major

stockholder

(Mr

Lords),

who

appealed an adverse trial court judgment against him.
In REVERSING THE TRIAL COURT'S ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
PERSONALLY AGAINST THE CORPORATE OFFICER, the Utah
Supreme Court wrote:
. . . The mere fact that Lords was president
and major stockholder of defendant corporation
through which he might derive an incidental
benefit from the corporate breach, does not
indicate he was acting for his personal
benefit. A corporation can only act through
its agents, and there is no evidence
indicating that Lords in his participation in
the transaction acted beyond the scope of his
powers or against the interests of the
corporation.
440 P.2d at 118. Emphasis added.
Indeed,

the

notwithstanding

"state
any

law"

"municipal

on

this

law"

in

subject
conflict

therewith, which conflict would render the municipal
provisions INVALID

is clearly consistent with those
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centuries-old

principles. Section

16-10a-302# Utah

Code, effective since 1992, provides for the following
"corporate powers":
(1) to sue and be sued, complain and defend
in its corporate name;
(4) to purchase, receive, lease, or otherwise
acquire and own, hold, improve, use, and
otherwise deal with, real or personal
property, or any legal or equitable interest
in property, wherever located;
Emphasis added.
The provisions of Section 10-1-202 of the CITY'S
own Municipal Code are significant:
10-1-202 CONSTRUCTIVE
DOCUMENTS.

NOTICE

OF

RECORDED

Whenever a document is recorded with the
County Recorder as authorized or required by
this Title or applicable state codes,
recordation shall provide constructive notice
of the information contained in the recorded
document.
Emphasis added. In 1993 the Defendant FOY conveyed
Quit-Claim Deed properly delivered

by

to the grantee

(Lancer, Incorporated) and thereafter RECORDED in the
Office of the Salt Lake County Recorder

to the

corporation LANCER, INCORPORATED her interest in the
"Lancer, Incorporated parcel". See Quit-Claim Deed,
dated 1 July 1993 and recorded 6 July 1993; recordation
# 5346983.

[The recordation of that Deed actually

CREATED the so-called "Lancer, Incorporated parcel".]
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

42

Thereafter, the entire world is "on notice" that the
corporation

not Defendant FOY

is THE OWNER of the

parcel. The CITY'S own ordinance [Section 10-1-202]
states

that

such

a

recordation

"shall

provide

constructive notice of the information contained in the
recorded document". Under Section 57-1-13, Utah Code,
a quit-claim deed properly executed and delivered
. . . shall have the effect of a conveyance of
all right, title, interest and estate of the
grantor in and to the premises therein
described and all rights, privileges and
appurtenances thereunto belonging, at the date
of such conveyance•
Emphasis added.
That the CITY, having made a major mistake in
overlooking
parcel"

the CORPORATE OWNERSHIP of the

upon

violations

which

were

the

majority

located,

of

cannot

now

the

"south
claimed

successfully

practice "damage control" by claiming that Defendant
FOY, as a "director" of the corporate entity, is
personally liable to pay the "fines" associated with
such

claimed

[Paragraph

3]

violations.

The

describes

the

CITY'S

complaint

"property"

(its

terminology) as the 104-foot north-south dimension
parcel: the 0.15-acre Teresa Foy parcel. The Complaint
thereafter
allegations

[Paragraph

5

thereof]

makes

denied in Defendant's "answer"

sweeping
as to

the existence of the SIX claimed "ordinance violations"
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formerly present upon "the property". The Defendant's
"answer" placed those allegations in dispute, by the
SEVENTH DEFENSE (observed violations on property owned
by others) and the EIGHTH DEFENSE

(failure to join

indispensable party: the owner of the parcel on which
the violations were actually observed).
Having

committed

a

major

blunder

in

its

administrative process (i.e. the "notice of violation")
and in its judicial pleading, the CITY has now
the Lancer parcel was pointed out to it
"save

face"

by

raising,

albeit

when

attempted to

incorrectly,

the

"corporate" issue.
The District Court was unquestionably informed of
this "factual" situation (dispute), but chose to ignore
the

same

in

erroneously

granting

summary

judgment

against Defendant F0Yo
IV
THE ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION, AS WELL
AS THIS JUDICIAL PROCEEDING SEEKING ENFORCEMENT
OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION, IS INVALID
INASMUCH AS IT CONTRAVENES THE EXPRESS PROVISIONS
OF SECTIONS 10-11-1 ET SEQ, UTAH CODE
The provisions of Section 10-11-1, Utah Code, are
directly applicable to the City's actions in observing
the clutter, deleterious objects, and debris upon real
estate

within

inspector

its

"shall"

boundaries:
(read:

the

municipality's

mandatory)

notify
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the

propertyowner and if the propertyowner doesn't clean it
up, the municipality may and may thereafter bill the
propertyowner for the expenses actually incurred! If
the propertyowner doesn't pay, the charges for those
clean-up expenses actually incurred may become a lien
against the parcel and subject to collection with the
property taxes. Certain procedural opportunities for
review and "appeal" are available to the propertyowner.
[The complete text to the provisions of Section 10-11-1
et seq, Utah Code

which have remained "on the books"

and unchanged for decades

are included herein as

EXHIBIT 3 to this APPELLANT'S BRIEF.]
These provisions
therewith

and the CITY' s failure to comply

were pleaded as a "defense" to the CITY'S

claims.
The "bottom line" is that the Legislature has
expressly mandated exactly what the municipality is to
do, when faced with a "debris, deleterious objects,
refuse" situation: this municipality is to clean it up
and

bill

the

propertyowner!

But

the

City

isn't

authorized to "fine" the person and receive monies, in
excess of those clean-up expenses!
These detailed provisions, expressly and explicitly
detailing every step to be followed

(in mandatory

context, through the use of the verb "shall"), are
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binding upon the CITY. The CITY'S attempted reliance
upon

other,

more

generalized,

generic

"enabling

legislation" pertaining to "nuisances"13 is misplaced!
In Harding vs Alpine City, 656 P. 2d 985 (Utah
Supreme Court 1982), the municipality had adopted a
sewer-connection

ordinance

at

variance

with

the

statute, in that the municipality could have required
the propertyowner to connect to a sewer system which
was

further

away

than

3 00

feet

(which

was

the

limitation under the statute). [The statute impliedly
allowed a propertyowner who was not within 3 00 feet of
the

existing

sewer

line

to

not

connect.]

In

invalidating the ordinance, the Supreme Court held that
the conflicting

ordinance was

"clearly beyond the

City's powers". The Harding Court quoted from the State
vs Hutchinson decision, as follows:
There are ample safeguards against any abuse
of power
at
the
local
level. Local
governments, as subdivisions of the State,
exercise those powers granted to them by the
State Legislature, and the exercise of a
delegated power is subject to the limitations

13

No showing was ever made and the actual text of the
ordinance provisions under which the Defendant was "charged"
and administratively "fined" were presented to the Court, to
the effect that the CITY itself
by express ordinance
designated the debris, unsightly materials, etc., situation as
being a "nuisance". Thus, any "enabling legislation", if any,
cited by the CITY as being applicable to the "civil fines" for
such
"nuisances"
is
INAPPLICABLE
and
INAPPROPRIATE,
particularly in the face of the express provisions of Section
10-11-1 et Digitized
seq,by Utah
Code.
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imposed by state statute and state and federal
constitutions. 624 P.2d at 1121.
Emphasis added. Citations to cases omitted in original
text.
The

Harding

applicable

to

analysis

the

case

and
at

result

bar.

In

is

clearly

the

instant

situation, Section 10-11-1, Utah Code, dealing with the
very "debris", "junk" and other refuse allegedly at
issue, allows the citizen propertyowner certain rights:
(1) notification, (2) 20 days in which to respond to
the notification, (3) which notification is mailed,
certified mail, and (but not only) (4) the right to be
billed ONLY FOR THE ACTUAL COSTS THE MUNICIPALITY
ACTUALLY INCURS IN THE CLEAN-UP! To allow WEST VALLEY

CITY to disregard the provisions of Section 10-11-1,
Utah Code, absolutely applicable to the case at bar,
results

in the very

situation which rendered the

municipal ordinance in Harding invalid: namely, that
certain portions of the statutory text would have to be
read

(and/or not-applied) , as a nullity. This the

Supreme Court was unwilling to do. In the case at bar,
we are not dealing with merely a few words of statutory
text: we're dealing with hundreds and hundreds of words
contained

in

Section

10-11-1

et

seq,

Utah Code.

Plaintiff's position seeks to ignore each and every one
of those words!
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The West Valley Ordinance and the A.C.E. program
established

thereunder

(providing

for

"fines" and

"civil penalties" unrelated to the actual clean-up
costs as contemplated by Section 10-11-1 et seq, Utah
Code), are in conflict with State Statute and are
invalid!
V
TRIAL COURTS DISMISSAL OF "WRONGFUL LIEN"
COUNTERCLAIM WAS IMPROPER DUE TO
GENUINE DISPUTE AS TO FACT
Following

the issuance of the

"administrative

order" assessing the $6,900 in administrative fines
against Defendant FOY, the CITY filed for record with
the Salt Lake County Recorder a "Notice of Violation".
The City's stated purpose in doing so was to "notify"
the

propertyowner.

[That

stated

reason

was

disingenuous, as the propertyowner was already aware
through direct mailings to her
administrative

order.]

The

of the entry of the
real

purpose

of

the

recordation was to "lien" the real property, so as to
be able to collect those assessed

"administrative

fines".
The Defendant FOY, through her agents, demanded in
writing that the CITY remove the "liens", asserted to
be "wrongful liens" in contravention of Section 38-9-1,
Utah Code, in that they were not authorized by statute
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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and/or they contained material misstatements. When the
CITY refused, the Defendant FOY filed a counterclaim.
RECORD at 000203-000221.
The CITY responded that the filings were not
"liens". However, before the Defendant FOY could obtain
meaningful

responses

to

her

pre-trial

discovery

requests (concerning how many "satisfaction" payments
were received when parcels so "liened" were sold to
third-parties
"protective

the CITY applied for and received a
order"

foreclosing

any

effective

"discovery" on the issue.14
CONCLUSION
The District

Court

erred

in granting

summary

judgment against Defendant FOY, when so many of the
necessary

"facts"

were

"in

genuine

dispute":

particularly, when a "request for hearing" had been
TIMELY FILED. The "agency" arguments advanced by the
City are not only inconsistent with the mandatory
provisions of its own ordinances (requiring a hearing
to be held), but are also inconsistent with state law

14

That the District Court eventually granted a "remand"
to an administrative hearing officer for three limited areas
of inquiry (i.e. did the observed "clutter" belong to the
Defendant, what efforts FOY had made towards the clean-up, and
what costs did the CITY incur in the clean-up) did not change
the problem. The "protective order" effectively precluded any
meaningful development of any factual record as to what the
CITY'S intentions and/or the CITY'S awarenesses as to the
operational effect of the "liens".
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(that is, that a corporation can act only through its
"agents") . That the CITY (and the District Court) were
fully aware that MOST of the claimed violations were
located upon the Lancer, Incorporated parcel precludes,
as a matter of law, the judgment against Defendant FOY,
on the claimed basis that she was a "director" of that
corporation and thus is a "responsible party".
The

CITY'S

"code

enforcement

procedures"

(ostensibly authorizing "administrative fines") when in
fact the CITY incurred no actual expenses in the cleanup of the parcel(s), contradicts the detailed and
binding guidelines and requirements of Section 10-11-1
et seq, Utah Code, properly pleaded as a "defense" and
which should have been overcome before summary judgment
could have been entered.
The District Court's granting of summary judgment
on the "wrongful lien" counterclaim was in error, in
light

of

the

factual

disputes

as

to

the

"lien"

documents actually filed.
The judgment of the District Court should be and
must be reversed.
Respectfully submitted this 25th day of November,
2003.

AtVorneTror Appellant
TERESA FOY
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ADDENDA

EXHIBIT 1: 25 October 1997 REQUEST FOR HEARING
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October 25, 1997
to: Administrative Hearing Coordinator
City of West Valley
Ordinance Enforcement Office
3600 South Consitutuion Blv.
West Valley, Utah 64119
re: case* 97-5215
from: Renter K. Cooper
3247 West 3650 South
West Valley, Utah 64119

Dear Sirs,
Please schedual a hearing as to the above.
Request: 1. That,the ordinance officer who issued the citation be present
at the hearing.
2. That the officer be available for minor questions, disscussion.

The landlady, of this particular property, resides in distance South
Eastern, Utah. She has made it very clear that she will have no envolement
whatsoever. Furtherwell, she expects this matter to be handle between
us here in West Valley City. Mail, directives should be sent to the renter
at above address.
The Landlady's only wish: to be informed "once and only once" of the
clearance/resolution of these charges.
Could a complete copy of the citation as well as excerpts of the city code
cited as violations be mailed? We will be expecting a letter directly
from the City Ordinance, soon.
Thank you,
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EXHIBIT 1

000055

342 South 200 Est 63-11
Blanding, Utah 84511
November 24, 1997
Terrie Nordell
Ordinance Enforcement Officer
3600 Constitution Blvd.
West Valley City, Utah 84119-3720
Dear Ms. Terrie Nordell or others concerned:
Tins letter is to inform you in writing of what T talked to you about on the
18th of November. I am working on the papers you said you needed from my
attorney. He recommended 1 quickly finish the divorce and get the papers to you
stating when 1 left the house and abandoned the property to James Weston Decker,
who is at present my husband. These papers will state the house is to be Weston's
as ownership with the divorce. So these papers will be forth coming as soon as
possible.
1, Teresa Decker, as deed owner of the home, give James Weston Decker
the authority to invite inspectors on to the property at 3247 Lancer Way to inspect
the grounds and deal with this man on this issue.
If there is any question you have feel free to contact myself or my attorney.
My number is 1-435-678-2788 in Blanding, Utah orrayattorney, Steven C. Russell
at Affordable Legal Advocates. Their number is 532-5100. Nancy would be the
one that could best answers your questions there.
Sincerely,

Teresa Foy Decker
2 * Not* Mdn

|

/

,

,

\

J
EXHIBIT 2

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

nArc

1 r\c:

1DA/^C

J

_ _

000052

STEPHEN G HOMER (1536)
Attorney at Law
9225 South Redwood Road
West Jordan, Utah 84088
Telephone (801) 561-9665
Attorney for Defendant TERESA FOY
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
WEST VALLEY CITY DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH

WEST VALLEY CITY#
Plaintiff
vs

DEFENDANT'S SECOND SET OF
REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS BY
PLAINTIFF WEST VALLEY CITY
Civil No. 980103950CV

TERESA FOY,
Defendant

Case assigned to Judge Brian

TO THE PLAINTIFF WEST VALLEY CITY AND ITS ATTORNEY:
The Defendant TERESA FOY, pursuant to the provisions of Rule
36 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, requests

that the

Plaintiff WEST VALLEY CITY admit, for the purposes of the pending
action only, the truth of the matters identified herein. Please
note that the matter will be deemed to be admitted unless said
request is responded to within 30 days after service of the
request.
Your answer, if the request is denied, shall specifically deny
the matter set forth or set forth in detail why tlie answering party
cannot truthfully admit or deny the matter..A denial shall fairly
meet the substance of the requested admission, and when good faith
requires that a party qualify its answer or deny only a part of the
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EXHIBIT 3

000684

matter of which an admission is requested, the party shall so
specify so much of which of it as is true and qualify the
remainder.
DEFINITIONS
As utilized in this Requests for Admissions, the following words
and phrases have the following meanings:
The phrase "the City", "you", "your" and derivatives
thereof refer to the Plaintiff WEST VALLEY CITY and/or
its authorized officers, agents and employees acting
within the scope of their employment with Defendant WEST
VALLEY CITY, as appropriate.
The phrase "Teresa Foy parcel" means and refers to that
certain real estate located within Salt Lake County and
having a street address of 3247 West Lancer Way (3650
South), West Valley City, Utah. The legal description of
the real estate is:.
Beginning at a point which is on the South
right-of-way line, of 3650 South Street, said
point being 1377.7 feet South and 275 feet
West from the Northeast Corner of Section 32,
Township 1 South, Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base
and Meridian, and running thence West 64 feet;
thence South 104 feet/ thence East 64 feet;
thence North 10'4 feet to the point of
beginning, [Contains 0.15 acres.] [Salt Lake
County Sidwell # 15-32-278-054]
The phrase "Lancer, Incorporated parcel" means and refers
to that certain real estate located in Salt Lake County
and more particularly described as follows:
Beginning at a point which is South 104 feet
and 1377.7 feet and West 275 feet from the
Northeast Corner of Section 32, Township 1
South, i Range 1 West, Salt Lake Base and
Meridian, and running thence South 204 feet;
thence West 64 feet; thence North 204 feet; ,
thence East 64 feet to the point of beginnihg.
[Contains 0.30 acres.] [Salt Lake County
Sidwell # 15-32-278-055]

2
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EXHIBIT 3

REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS BY PLAINTIFF WEST VALLEY CITY
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION # 1.

Admit that on or about 14 October

1997 the Defendant TERESA FOY was the owner of the Teresa Foy
parcel.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION # 2.

Admit that the administrative case

file to which the "administrative code enforcement" [hereinafter
sometimes "A.C.E."] action involving the "Teresa Foy parcel" was
assigned was and is referred to by the case file number of 97-5215.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION # 3.

Admit

that

the

administrative

enforcement and judicial proceedings within A.C.E. case file #976058 against the Lancer, Incorporated parcel involved the same
alleged violations (or at least some of them) which formed the
basis of the administrative code enforcement action against the
Teresa Foy parcel in A.C.E. case file #97-5215.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION # 4.

Admit that following the conclusion

of the "Jim Decker case" involving the Lancer, Incorporated parcel
and alleged violations upon such parcel, as contained within A.C.E.
case file #97-6058, West Valley City filed in the Third Judicial
District Court a civil action against Jim Decker and obtained a
money

judgment

against

Jim

Decker

for , the

fines

and

costs

administratively assessed for the alleged violations, if any, upon
the parcel in case file #97-6058, which District Court judgment was
fully paid and satisfied.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION # 5.

Admit that the violations which the

agents of the Plaintiff WEST VALLEY CITY claimed to observe were
3
STEPHEN 0 HOMER
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EXHIBIT 3

not entirely or singularly upon the Teresa Foy parcel, but rather
some of the claimed violations within A.C.E. case #97-5215 were
upon the Lancer, Incorporated parcel.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION # 6.

Admit

that

the

request

for

administrative hearing on the "Teresa Foy parcel"of Defendant
TERESA FOY for the hearing was received by the Plaintiff WEST
VALLEY CITY in a timely manner, within the time periods specified
by ordinance.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION # 7.

Admit

that

in

response

to

the

"written request for hearing" on the Teresa Foy parcel in A.C.E.
case #97-5215, authorized personnel of West Valley City actually
scheduled a '"hearing" before the administrative law judge Lohra
Miller, said hearing to'be .held on or about December 3rd of 1997.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION # 8.

Admit

that

on

26

November

1997

authorized agents and employees of the Plaintiff WEST VALLEY CITY,
including but not limited 'to Code Enforcement Officer Cecelia
Giorgi, were invited to inspect the TERESA FOY premises and did in
fact conduct an inspection of the TERESA FOY premises.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION # 9.

Admit

that

on

26

November

1997

authorized agents and employees of the Plaintiff WEST VALLEY CITY,
including but not limited to ,Code Enforcement Officer Cecelia
Giorgi, were personally on the premises and failed to observe any
violations of municipal ordinances upon the TERESA FOY premises.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION # 10.

Admit that on 26 November 1997 and

for each day thereafter, continuously until and beyond 16 December

4
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1997, there were no violations on the TERESA FOY parcel.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION # 11.
aforementioned

Admit

that

except

for

the

26 November 1997 inspection of the TERESA FOY

parcel, agents of the Plaintiff WEST VALLEY CITY did not conduct
any inspections of the TERESA FOY parcel between the dates of 14
October 1997 and 16'December 1997.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION #

12. Admit that on 26 November 1997 and on

each date thereafter, to and including 16 December 1997, the
Plaintiff WEST VALLEY CITY, through its authorized agents and
employees, including but not limited to Code Enforcement Officer
Cecelia Giorgi, was aware or should have been aware that there were
no violations of municipal ordinance upon the TERESA FOY premises.
REQUEST FOR'ADMISSION # 13.

Admit that the Plaintiff WEST VALLEY

CITY, following receipt of the request for a hearing, initially
scheduled a hearing to be held on 8 December 1997 in A.C.E. case
file 97-5215 (the "Teresa Fpy" case).
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION # 14.
Officer

Lohra

Miller,

Admit that on 3 December 1997 Hearing

without

the

requested

hearing

being

conducted, signed an "order of abatement" for the TERESA FOY
parcel.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION # 15.
hearing

in

case' #

97-5215

Admit that on 8 December 1997 the
involving

the

claimed

violations

occurring on the TERESA FOY parcel was unilaterally cancelled by
the agents and employees of the Plaintiff WEST VALLEY CITY.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION # 16.

Admit that on 8 December 1997 the

5
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Plaintiff WEST VALLEY CITY held a hearing on case number 97-6058
[the "Jim Decker case"], involving only the Lancer, Incorporated
parcel and not the Teresa Foy parcel.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION # 17.
December 16th

Admit that the December 3rd and the

"administrative orders" and the

"administrative

fines" assessed thereunder were not based upon first-hand evidence
presented to the Hearing Officer, but rather upon the presumption
that the claimed violation continues each date until municipal
inspectors inspect the property and determine that the claimed
violation has been terminated.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION # 18.

Admit that the December 3rd and the

December 16th'"administrative orders" were contrary to the evidence
and contrary to the knowledge possessed by the agents of the
Plaintiff WEST VALLEY CITY, including but not limited to Code
Enforcement Officer Cecelia Giorgi, from the 26 November 1997
inspection and observations upon and of the Teresa Foy parcel.
REQUEST FOR ADMISSION # 19.

Admit that on 16 December 1997 agents

of the Plaintiff WEST VALLEY CITY inspected the TERESA FOY parcel
and

again

found

the

parcel

to be

ordinances.

in

compliance

with

city

*

Respectfully submitted this, 5th day of March, 2002.

Att^ney^for Defendant TERESA FOY

6
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Elliot R. Lawrence — Bar no. 6917
Attorney for Plaintiff
WEST VALLEY CITY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
3600 Constitution Blvd.
West Valley City, Utah 84119
Phone: (801)963-3271
Fax: (801)963-3366
Elawrence^i.west-valley.ut.us
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT
1

WEST VALLEY CITY, a Utah municipal
corporation,
Plaintiff,

•

" - " ^ » -

m i

" "

" ' " " • • ' • • " • '• '" " ' ••" "•"•• ' "•••"

" '

»

" •" ' ' • •..••'.J.I . L - . - M

RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S
REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS

(

Case no.: 980103590

vs.
Judge: Pat B. Brian

TERESA FOY,
Defendant.

PLAINTIFF/WEST VALLEY CITY (the "01/0, respectfully submits this Response to
Defendant's Requests for Admissions. In doing so, the City does not acknowledge that discovery
in this matter has been reopened, and these responses are being submitted with the intent of resolving
the matter presently before the Court. The responses to the requests are set forth below, with the
numbers corresponding to the requests in the March 5, 2002 document.
RESPONSES
1.

The City neither admits nor denies this request. The records of the Salt Lake County
Recorder are the best evidence pertaining to this request, and speak for themselves.
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2.

The City neither admits nor denies this request. The records of the West Valley City
Ordinance Enforcement Division, and the records previously submitted in this matter, are the
best evidence pertaining to this request, and speak for themselves.

3.

The City neither admits nor denies this request. The records of the West Valley City
Enforcement Division, and the records previously submitted in this matter, are the best
evidence pertaining to this request, and speak for themselves.

4.

The City neither admits nor denies this request. The records of the West Valley City
Enforcement Division, the records of the Third District Court, and the records previously
submitted in this matter, are the best evidence pertaining to this request, and speak for
themselves.

5.

The City neither admits nor denies this request. The records of the West Valley City
Enforcement Division, and the records previously submitted in this matter, are the best
evidence pertaining to this request, and speak for themselves.

6.

.

The City neither admits nor denies this request. The records of the West Valley City
Enforcement Division, and the records previously submitted in this matter, are the best
evidence pertaining to this request, and speak for themselves.

7.

The City neither admits nor denies this request. The. records of the West Valley City
Enforcement Division, and the records previously submitted in this matter, are the best
evidence pertaining to this request, and speak for themselves.

8.

The City neither admits nor denies this request. The records of the West Valley City
Enforcement Division, and the records previously submitted in this matter, are the best
evidence pertaining to this request, and speak for themselves.
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9.

The City neither admits nor denies this request. The records of the West Valley City
Enforcement Division, and the records previously submitted in this matter, are the best
evidence pertaining to this request, and speak for themselves.

10.

The City neither admits nor denies this request. The records of the West Valley City
Enforcement Division, and the records previously submitted in this matter, are the best
evidence pertaining to this request, and speak for themselves.

11.

The City neither admits nor denies this request. The records of the West Valley City
Enforcement Division, and the records previously submitted in this matter, are the best
evidence pertaining to this request, and speak for themselves.

12.

The City neither admits nor denies this request. The records of the West Valley City
Enforcement Division, and the records previously submitted in this matter, are the best
evidence pertaining to this request, and speak for themselves.

13.

The City neither admits nor denies this request. The records of the West Valley City
Enforcement Division, and the records previously submitted in this matter, are the best
evidence pertaining to this request, and speak for themselves.

14.

The City neither admits nor denies this request. The records of the West Valley City
Enforcement Division, and the records previously submitted in this matter, are the best
evidence pertaining to this request, and speak for themselves.

15.

The City neither admits nor denies this request. The records of the West Valley City
Enforcement Division, and the records previously submitted in this matter, are the best
evidence pertaining to this request, and speak for themselves.

16.

t

The City neither admits nor denies this request. The records of the West Valley City
-3-
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Enforcement Division, and the records previously submitted in this matter, are the best
evidence pertaining to this request, and speak for themselves.
17.

The City neither admits nor denies this request. The records of the West Valley City
Enforcement Division, and the records previously submitted in this matter, are the best
, evidence pertaining to this request, and speak for themselves.

18.

The City neither admits nor denies this request. The records of the West Valley City
Enforcement Division, and the records previously submitted in this matter, are the best
evidence pertaining to this request, and speak for themselves.

19.

The City neither admits nor denies this request. The records of the West Valley City
Enforcement Division, and the records previously submitted in this matter, are the best
evidence pertaining to this request, and speak for themselves.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 26th day of March, 2002.

ELLIOT R. LAWRENCE
Assistant City Attorney

•
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CHAPTER 11
INSPECTION AND CLEANING
Section
10-11-1.
10-11-2.
10-11-3.
10-11-4.

Abatement of weeds, garbage, refuse and unsightly objects.
Notice to property owners.
Neglect of property owners — Removal by city Costs of removal.
Costs of removal to be included in tax notice.

10-11-1. Abatement of weeds, garbage, refuse and unsightly objects.
The city commissioners of cities of the first and second class
and the city councils of the cities of the third class, and the
board of trustees of towns, may designate, and regulate the
abatement of, injurious and noxious weeds, garbage, refuse or
any unsightly or deleterious objects or structures, and may
appoint a city inspector for the purpose of carrying out the
provisions of this chapter.
1953
10-11-2. Notice to property owners.
It shall be the duty of such city inspector to make careful
examination and investigation, as may be provided by ordinance, of the growth and spread of such injurious and noxious
weeds, and of garbage, refuse or unsightly or deleterious
objects or structures; and it shall be his duty to ascertain the
names of the owners and descriptions of the premises where
such weeds, garbage, refuse, objects or structures exist, and to
serve notice in writing upon the owner or occupant of such
land, either personally or by mailing notice, postage prepaid,
addressed to the owner or occupant at the last known postoffice address as disclosed by the records of the county assessor, requiring such owner or occupant, as the case may be, to
eradicate, or destroy and remove, the same within such time
as the inspector may designate, which shall not be less than
ten days from the date of service of such notice. One notice
shall be deemed sufficient on any lot or parcel of property for
the entire season of weed growth during that year. The
inspector shall make proof of service of such notice under oath,
and file the same in the office of the county treasurer.
1953
10-11-3.

Neglect of property owners — Removal by city
— Costs of removal.
If any owner or occupant of lands described in such notice
shall fail or neglect to eradicate, or destroy and remove, such
weeds, garbage, refuse, object or structure upon the premises
in accordance with such notice, it shall be the duty of the
inspector, at the expense of the municipality, to employ necessary assistance and cause such weeds, garbage, refuse,
objects or structures to be removed or destroyed. He shall
prepare an itemized statement of all expenses incurred in the
removal and destruction of same and shall mail a copy thereof
to the owner demanding payment within twenty days of the
date of mailing. Said notice shall be deemed delivered when
mailed by registered mail addressed to the property owner's

last known address. In the event the owner fails to make
payment of the amount set forth in said statement to the
municipal treasurer within said twenty days, the inspector, on
behalf of the municipality, may cause suit to be brought in an
appropriate court of law or may refer the matter to the county
treasurer as hereinafter provided. In the event collection of
said costs are pursued through the courts, the municipality
may sue for and receive judgment upon all of said costs crt
removal and destruction together with reasonable attorneys'
fees, interest and court costs. The municipality may execute
on such judgment in the manner provided by law. In the event
that the inspector elects to refer the matter to the county
treasurer for inclusion in the tax notice of the property owner,
he shall make, in triplicate, an itemized statement of all
expenses incurred in the removal and destruction of the same
and shall deliver the three copies of said statement to the
county treasurer within ten days after the completion of the
work of removing such weeds, garbage, refuse, objects or
1963
structures.
10-11-4. Costs of removal to be included in tax notice.
Upon receipt of the itemized statement of the cost of
destroying or removing such weeds, refuse, garbage, objects,
or structures, the county treasurer shall forthwith mail one
copy to the owner of the land from which the same were
removed, together with a notice that objection in writing may
be made within 30 days to the whole or any part of the
statement so filed to the county legislative body. The county
treasurer shall at the same time deliver a copy of the state-

ment to the clerk of the county legislative body. If objections to
any statement are filed with the county legislative body, they
shall set a date for hearing, giving notice thereof, and upon the
hearing fix and determine the actual cost of removing the
weeds, garbage, refuse, or unsightly or deleterious objects or
structures, and report their findings to the county treasurer. If
no objections to the items of the account so filed are made
within 30 days of the date of mailing such itemized statement,
the county treasurer shall enter the amount of such statement
on the assessment rolls of the county in the column prepared
for that purpose, and likewise within ten days from the date of
the action of the county legislative body upon objections filed
shall enter in the prepared column upon the tax rolls the
amount found by the county legislative body as the cost of
removing and destroying the said weeds, refuse, garbage or
unsightly and deleterious objects or structures. If current tax
notices have been mailed, said taxes may be carried over on
the rolls to the following year. After the entry by the county
treasurer of the costs of removing weeds, garbage, refuse or
unsightly and deleterious objects or structures the amount so
entered shall have the force and effect of a valid judgment of
the district court, and shall be a lien upon the lands from
which the weeds, refuse, garbage or unsightly and deleterious
objects or structures were removed and destroyed, and shall
be collected by the county treasurer at the time of the payment
of general taxes. Upon payment thereof receipt shall be
acknowledged upon the general tax receipt issued by the
treasurer.
1993
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SELECTED WEST VALLEY CITY CODE ORDINANCE PROVISIONS
1-1-102
RULES OF CONSTRUCTION.
In the construction of this Code, and of all ordinances of the City, the
following rules shall be observed, unless such construction would be
inconsistent with the manifest intent of the City Council, or the content
clearly requires or indicates otherwise.
(3)
"May" means the requirement, condition,
referred to in the sentence is permissive.

or

action

(6)
"Shall" means the requirement, condition, or action
referred to in the sentence is mandatory.
10-1-109
GENERAL RULES OF INTERPRETATION OF ORDINANCE.
For purposes of this Title:
(2) Shall is mandatory, may is permissive.
10-1-110.

DEFINITIONS.

(19) "Property Owner" means the record owner of real property based on
the County Assessor's records.
(21) "Responsible Person" means a person the City determines is
responsible for causing or maintaining a violation of the City Codes or
applicable state codes. The term "Responsible Person" includes, but is
not limited to, a property owner, tenant, person with a legal interest
in real property, or person in possession of real property.
10-2-103. REQUESTING HEARING.
The responsible person has the right to request an administrative
hearing. The request must be in writing and must be filed within ten days
from the date of service of the notice of violation. Failure to request
a hearing as provided shall constitute a waiver of the right to a
hearing.
10-2-501. DECLARATION OF PURPOSE.
The City Council finds that there is a need to establish uniform
procedures for administrative code enforcement hearings conducted
pursuant to the City Code. It is the purpose and intent of the City
Council to afford due process of law to any person who is directly
affected by an administrative action. Due process of law includes
adequate notice, an opportunity to participate in the administrative
hearing, and an adequate explanation of the reasons justifying the
administrative action. These procedures are also intended to establish
a forum to efficiently, expeditiously, and fairly resolve issues raised
in any administrative enforcement action.
10-2-503

REQUEST FOR ADMINISTRATIVE CODE ENFORCEMENT HEARING

(2) The request for hearing shall be made in writing and filed with the
Director.
(3) As soon as practicable after receiving the written notice of the
request for hearing, the Director shall appoint an administrative code
enforcement hearing office and schedule a date, time, and place for the
hearing.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL COURT, IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT

WEST VALLEY CITY, a Utah
municipal corporation,
Plaintiff;

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case No. 980103590

_•••;..

Honorable PAT B.BRIAN

TERESAFOY,
Defendant.

1fl
The above entitled matter comes before the Court for decision on the Plaintiffs motion
for summary judgment. The Court heard oral argument addressing the motion on January 13,
2003. The Court having reviewed all relevant memoranda submitted by the parties, applicable
statutes and case lawfindsno genuine issues of material fact exist and concludes that the
Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment is
GRANTED. .
f2
The following facts apply tp resolve the Plaintiffs motion. This protracted collection suit
was filed in 1998 by West Valley City (Plaintiff) against Teresa Foy (Foy) for outstanding fines
relating to several ordinance violations of property owned and/or controlled by Foy. After a
remand to an Administrative Law Judge and mediation, the collection suit has returned to this
Court. In summary, on October 14, 1997, an ordinance enforcement officer on behalf of Plaintiff
conducted an inspection of the West Valley property 3247 West 3650 South. That same day, the
Plaintiff sent a notice of violation (notice) to Foy in Blanding, Utah, where she was living at the
time. Foy admits receiving the notice. Foy admits that she did not respond to the notice and did
not attempt to obtain a notice of compliance by October 30, 1997, as required and explained in
the notice. Foy contacted her estranged husband, James W. Decker, (Decker) who was living on
the property, and told him "this needs to be taken care of."
1J3
The notice stated that: "You have the right to request a hearing to determine if any
violations exist on your property or if you have allowed violations to occur for which you are
responsible. You must file a written request for hearing within 10 days from the date the notice
of violation was issued. If the notice was mailed, the request for hearing must be made within 13
days of the mailing date. Address the request to the attention of'Administrative Hearing
Coordinator.' Please include your name, address, telephone number, case or citation number,
and violation address." The notice further emphasized in bold letters and a larger font than the
rest of the notice that: "***Failure to file a written request for a hearing within 10 days
waives your right to a hearing.***"
1f4
Foy sent a letter dated November 24, 1997, to the Plaintiff to memorialize a conversation
she had with them on November 18, 1997, that she was divorcing Decker and that he had been
deeded her portion of the subject property.
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Utah R. Civ. P. 56 provides that the court may grant a motion for summary judgment if
no genuine issues of material fact exist and the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
All facts are to be construed in favor of the non-moving party.
1f6
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14 provides that: "A party may seek judicial review only after
exhausting all administrative remedies available, except that: (a) a party seeking judicial review
need not exhaust administrative remedies if this chapter or any other statute states that exhaustion
is not required; (b) the court may relieve a party seeking judicial review of the requirement to
exhaust any or all administrative remedies if: (i) the administrative remedies are inadequate; or
* (ii) exhaustion of remedies would result in irreparable harm disproportionate to the public benefit
derived from requiring exhaustion."
f7
The Plaintiff argues that Foy failed to exhaust her administrative remedies by requesting
a hearing and the Plaintiff is authorized to imposefinesupon persons responsible for ordinance
violations, therefore, the Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In opposition, Foy
argues that a letter sent by "Renter K. Cooper Request for Hearing." was sufficient to invoke her
request for a hearing as Cooper was an agent of Foy.
1[8
The Court concludes that no genuine issues of material fact exist and the Plaintiff is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Foy failed to exhaust her administrative
remedies. Even viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Foy, as this Court must do, the
facts show that Foy failed to request a hearing. Foy admits in her own deposition that she
received the notice and did nothing about it. Generally, whether there was an agency relationship
would be a question of fact that would defeat a motion for summary judgment, however, an
agency relationship requires permission either actual or implied that'a person is acting as an
agent of another. Foy has failed to show that she gave Cooper such permission or implied such
permission. In fact, for over a month, until November 18, 1997, the record shows that Foy did
\ nothing, except call Decker, who was living on the property at the time, and telling him "this
needs to be taken care of." Furthermore, the notice clearly informed Foy that she had "a right to
request a hearing to determine if any violations exist on your property or if you have allowed
violations to occur for which you are responsible" and the amount of time for her to do so. At
this late juncture, Foy has tried to dispute that the violations existed on her property and that she
is responsible for such violations. Foy's remedy at law was an administrative hearing. There is
nothing in the record to show that such a hearing request was made by Foy. Moreover, Foy has
failed to show that she should be relieved from the exhaustion of remedies rule. There is nothing
here to show that a hearing would have been an inadequate remedy or that exhaustion of
remedies would result in irreparable harm disproportionate to the public benefit derived from
requiring exhaustion. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Foy improperly seeks judicial
review of facts without exhausting all administrative remedies available, namely a hearing,
therefore, the Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

2
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Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment and
ORDERS the Plaintiff to submit an order reflecting the Court's decision.
It is so ORDERED on this

D i s t r ^ o u ^ ^ J

J
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JOHN W. HUBER, Bar No. 7226
WEST VALLEY CITY PROSECUTOR
3575 S. Market Street, 2nd Floor
West Valley City, UT 84119
(801)963-3331

PILED
WEST VALLEY DEPT.

MAY 0 7 2003
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT
Time__

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
)
)

FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
AND ORDER

vs.

)

Case No. 980103590

TERESA FOY,

)

Honorable PAT B. BRIAN

WEST VALLEY CITY,
Plaintiff,

Defendant.

The above entitled matter comes before this Court on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment. After reviewing the legal memoranda and oral arguments by both parties, the Court
finds that Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Teresa Foy (Foy) failed to
exhaust her administrative remedies; namely, Foy did not request an administrative hearing. The
Court hereby enters the following Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law, and Order.
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. On October 14, 1997, an ordinance enforcement officer employed by Plaintiff
conducted an inspection of Foy's property in West Valley City and found it was not in
compliance with the City Code.
2. That same day, the ordinance enforcement officer sent a notice of violation to Foy's
residence in Blanding, Utah.
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3. Foy received the notice, as she admitted, but did not respond and did not attempt to
obtain a notice of compliance by October 30,1997, as required by the notice she received.
4. The notice of violation stated that Foy could request a hearing within 10 days from the
date the notice, of violation was issued. The notice also stated that failure to file a written request
for a hearing within 10 days constituted a waiver of the right to a hearing.

;

4. Foy did not request a hearing in the allotted time. By failing to request a hearing
within the designated time, Foy failed to exhaust her administrative remedies.
6. Foy has failed to show that she should be relieved from the exhaustion of remedies
rules because she has provided no evidence that a hearing would have been an inadequate remedy
or that exhaustion of remedies would result in irreparable harm disproportionate to the public
benefit derived from requiring exhaustion.
7. Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Foy failed to exhaust her
administrative remedies.
ORDER
NOW THEREFORE, the Court having made its Findings of Facts and Conclusions of
Law, and for good cause shown, Orders the following:
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

Dated this 7

day of

/7v^^2003

f//£^&»<*

Nfe^jf*^ 000713

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

EXHIBIT 8

